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Kenya vs. The ICC Prosecutor 
 
Charles Chernor Jalloh* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On August 30, 2011, the Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
by a majority, rejected Kenya’s admissibility challenges under Article 19(2)(b) of the 
ICC Statute1 in cases involving several Kenyans who allegedly perpetrated crimes 
                                                
 
* Assistant Professor, University of Pittsburgh School of Law, Pennsylvania, U.S.A.; E-mail: 
jallohc@gmail.com. 
This paper builds on arguments in a case note first published in the January 2012 issue of 
the American Journal of International Law. I wish to thank Janewa OseiTutu, FIU College of Law, 
for her usual wonderful feedback on an early draft. I am indebted to Sam Derrick, my former 
research assistant, for his excellent help researching for this article. I appreciate the hard work 
of the editors, especially Matthew Bobby and Lucianna Hayden. Errors and omissions are 
mine. 
1 See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 19(2)(b), July 17, 1998, U.N. 
Doc. A/CONF.183/9 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
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against humanity during the December 2007 post-election violence.2 The ICC’s denial 
of Kenya’s admissibility challenge is significant because this is the first time since the 
Rome Statute entered into force on July 1, 2002 that a State Party has challenged the 
Court’s assertion of jurisdiction over its nationals on the basis that the State Party 
itself is investigating the incidents at issue. Accordingly, Kenya has argued it should 
therefore be given time and space to do its own investigation before interference 
from the Hague-based court. This important judgment therefore merits some 
attention, which this case note aims to help provide. 
The ICC’s involvement in Kenya began on March 31, 2010 when the Pre-Trial 
Chamber authorized then Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo to commence a formal 
investigation into the situation; the Pre-Trial Chamber ruled that potential cases from 
the East African nation would be admissible at the permanent Hague-based court 
because Kenya was not investigating or prosecuting the senior political and business 
leaders allegedly bearing greatest responsibility for the violence, which amounted to 
crimes against humanity within the ICC’s jurisdiction.3 A year later, at the 
prosecution’s request, the same judges issued summonses for six individuals 
associated with the current Kenyan government, namely: Uhuru Kenyatta (Deputy 
Prime Minister and Minister of Finance), Francis Muthaura (Head of the Public 
Service and Secretary to Cabinet), Mohammed Ali (Chief Executive and Head of the 
National Postal Corporation and former Chief of Police), William Ruto (Minister of 
Higher Education, Science and Technology), Henry Kosgey (Member of Parliament), 
                                                
 
2 Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11 OA, Judgment on the 
Appeal of the Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber II of 30 May 
2011 Entitled “Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging the 
Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute” (Aug. 30, 2011), 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1223134.pdf [hereinafter Appeals Chamber 
Judgment]; see also Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11 OA, 
Judgment on the Appeal of the Republic of Kenya Against the Decision of Pre-Trial Chamber 
II of 30 May 2011 Entitled “Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya 
Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute,” 
Dissenting Opinion of Judge Anita Ušacka (Sept. 20, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1234872.pdf [hereinafter Dissenting Opinion]. 
3 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, Case No. ICC-01/09-19, Decision Pursuant to Article 
15 of the Rome Statute on the Authorization of an Investigation into the Situation in the 
Republic of Kenya (Mar. 31, 2010), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc854562.pdf; see 
Charles Chernor Jalloh, International Decision: Situation in the Republic of Kenya, No. ICC-01/09-19, 
Decision on the Authorization of an Investigation, 105 AM. J. INT’L L. 540 (2011) (discussing the 
significance of the decision, which contains a seminal ruling regarding the scope of crimes 
against humanity). 
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and Joshua Sang (Head of Operations of a private radio station, Kass FM).4 The 
Court recently confirmed charges in four of those cases.5  
Three weeks later, Kenya requested that the Pre-Trial Chamber rule the matters 
involving its six nationals inadmissible before the Court.6 The application, which was 
supported by some of the suspects and opposed by the ICC prosecutor and victims 
of the post-election violence, was unanimously denied on May 30, 2011. Kenya then 
lodged its appeal, arguing that the Pre-Trial Chamber decision should be reversed 
because it contained serious legal, factual, and procedural errors.7 
II. KENYA’S ARGUMENTS: WE ARE INVESTIGATING (BUT NEED TIME TO MAKE 
REFORMS) 
Kenya’s appeal raised several issues of law, fact, and procedure. The factual and 
procedural issues are beyond the scope of this piece, but we will focus on legal issues. 
In any case, the appeal turned on the appropriate test that should be used under 
Article 17(1)(a) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Under that 
provision, which enshrines the foundational complementarity principle giving states 
the primary responsibility to investigate and prosecute offenses within ICC 
jurisdiction, the Court “shall determine that a case is inadmissible where: (a) [t]he case 
is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State 
is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”8  
It was obvious that Kenya, an ICC State Party, had jurisdiction over the shocking 
post-election violence that occurred on its territory following the disputed presidential 
                                                
 
4 See Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali, Case No. ICC-01/09-02/11, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s Application for Summonses to Appear for Francis Kirimi Muthaura, Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta and Mohammed Hussein Ali (Mar. 8, 2011), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1037052.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, Case No. ICC-
01/09-01/11, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Summons to Appear for William 
Samoei Ruto, Henry Kiprono Kosgey and Joshua Arap Sang (Mar. 8, 2011), 
http://212.159.242.181/iccdocs/doc/doc1037044.pdf. 
5 See Kenyatta and Ruto to Face ICC Trial Over Kenya Violence, BBC (Jan. 23, 2012), 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-16675268. 
6 Since Kenya’s admissibility challenge was denied, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber has 
confirmed charges against four of these six suspects that Kenyan media had dubbed the 
Ocampo Six (that presumably will now become the Ocampo Four). See Prosecutor v. Ruto, 
Kosgey & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges 
Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314535.pdf; Prosecutor v. Muthaura, Kenyatta & Ali, Case No. ICC-
01/09-02/11, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges Pursuant to Article 61(7)(a) and (b) of 
the Rome Statute (Jan. 23, 2012), http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1314543.pdf.  
7 Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 13.  
8 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 17(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
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elections. Since Kenya was before the Court insisting that it was willing and able to 
carry out the investigations or prosecutions, the real debate was what Article 17(1)(a) 
of the Rome Statute means in practice when it says that the ICC should find that “the 
case is being investigated” in order for the national jurisdiction to be able to pre-empt 
its work.  
The government argued that the Pre-Trial Chamber had misconstrued that phrase 
and, further, that it erred by failing to address Kenya’s challenge of the so-called 
“same person/same conduct” test that had been used as the benchmark for 
admissibility assessments.9 That test, which the pre-trial judges assumed Kenya had 
misunderstood, would require that a national criminal investigation encompass (1) the 
same person and (2) the same conduct that is the subject of the ICC “case” to be rendered 
inadmissible before the Court.10 Instead, according to the government, the better test 
that should have been used is whether the national proceedings capture the “same 
conduct in respect of persons at the same level in the hierarchy being investigated by 
the ICC.”11 In any event, the complementarity principle gives states a first right to 
carry out investigations and prosecutions in their own courts before the ICC 
jurisdiction would be triggered. That creates a presumption in their favor that should 
not be easily displaced in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the contrary. If 
the idea of complementarity underpinning Article 17 of the Rome Statute is to mean 
anything, it necessarily implies that member states must have a degree of flexibility to 
exercise their discretion in deciding whom to prosecute.  
III. THE PROSECUTION AND VICTIMS’ RESPONSE: NO, YOU ARE NOT 
INVESTIGATING  
The prosecutor and the victims disputed Kenya’s appeal claiming that the Pre-Trial 
Chamber had ignored or misconstrued the legal test applicable to inadmissibility 
assessments.12 To them, the government’s preferred test only applied to the 
admissibility determinations at the broader situation stage, as opposed to the specific 
case stage. In the prosecution’s view, Article 17 is at its core a conflict of jurisdiction 
provision in that it essentially sorts out whether the ICC or a jurisdiction-bearing state 
should take precedence where the two concurrently exercise authority over the same 
individual. Kenya’s faulty logic forecloses the possibility of each side simultaneously 
pursuing the same or different suspects for crimes or incidents arising from the same 
events.13  
                                                
 
9 Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, ¶¶ 26, 29. 
10 Id. ¶ 28. 
11 Id. ¶ 29. 
12 Id. ¶¶ 31–32. 
13 Id. ¶ 31. 
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IV. THE APPEALS CHAMBER RULING: WE AGREE WITH THE PROSECUTOR AND 
THE VICTIMS 
The majority of the Appeals Chamber clarified that this judgment offered the first 
opportunity for the Chamber to rule on the “same person” element of the “same 
person/same conduct” test.14 It explained that although Article 17 of the Rome 
Statute sets out how to resolve conflicts of jurisdiction between the ICC and its States 
Parties and ostensibly gives states the first right to prosecute the war crimes, crimes 
against humanity and genocide within ICC jurisdiction, the question whether “[t]he 
case is being investigated” is not a mere inquiry into whether a state is undertaking 
some abstract investigation over crimes committed on its territory.15 Rather, the 
crucial issue is whether the “same case” is being concurrently investigated by both the 
Court and the concerned national jurisdiction.16  
In addition, because Article 17 determinations arise at other stages of the Court’s 
proceedings, not only at the stage for evaluation of the admissibility of concrete cases, 
the meaning of the phrase “case is being investigated” in Article 17(1)(a) should 
properly be read in each of its contexts.17 For instance, during the Prosecutor’s 
initiation of investigations into situations under Article 15 (which also demands 
Article 17 analysis), the parameters of the likely cases will be relatively vague because 
the prosecutorial investigations would only be in their early stages. This makes it 
unlikely that the prosecution would identify specific suspects or their impugned 
conduct. On the other hand, with respect to challenges to admissibility under Article 
19, which relates to concrete cases where arrest warrants or summonses would have 
been issued, the determinative elements of the case would be more specific in relation 
to both the individual and the conduct in issue. Consequently, for there to be a judicial 
determination that the case is inadmissible at the ICC under Article 17(1)(a), “the 
national investigation must cover the same individual and substantially the same 
conduct as alleged in the proceedings before the Court.”18 
Applying this test to Kenya’s admissibility challenge implies that the cases would only 
be found inadmissible at the Court if the government can show that it was 
investigating those same suspects for substantially the same conduct by, for example, 
interviewing witnesses, collecting evidence, or undertaking forensic analysis. In the 
majority’s view, mere preparation to initiate such investigations or undertakings to do 
so in the future for suspects other than the specific individuals before the ICC would 
be insufficient to justify a finding of inadmissibility.19 Indeed, where there are only 
                                                
 
14 Id. ¶ 34. 
15 Id. ¶ 36. 
16 Id. 
17 Id. ¶ 38. 
18 Id. ¶ 39. 
19 Id. ¶ 40. 
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preparations to investigate instead of actual investigations, it would be incorrect to 
assert that the same case is being investigated by both the Court and the State Party 
thereby leading to a jurisdictional conflict that would then need to be resolved.  
Ultimately, the majority found that the Pre-Trial Chamber had applied the appropriate 
test. There was, therefore, no error of law requiring a reversal of its decision denying 
Kenya’s admissibility challenge.20  
V. DISSENTING OPINION: BUT WAIT A SECOND, KENYA DOES HAVE THE FIRST 
RIGHT TO PROSECUTE! 
In a strong dissent, issued three weeks after the majority opinion, 21 Judge Anita 
Ušacka suggested that she would have reversed the Pre-Trial Chamber decision 
because it contained material errors.22 Essentially, in her view, the Pre-Trial Chamber 
abused its discretion in failing to adapt the admissibility proceedings to fit the Kenya 
situation by: (1) refusing to sufficiently account for the country’s important arguments 
rooted in complementarity in this first admissibility challenge by an ICC State Party; 
(2) applying an unduly high burden in its definition of “investigation” and “case;” and 
(3) unnecessarily hastening the proceedings only to gloss over weighty legal and 
factual issues and to trample upon Kenya’s sovereign first right to investigate and 
prosecute the cases.23  
VI. WHY COMPLEMENTARITY IS THE KEY TO THE ICC’S SUCCESS AND AN 
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH 
The principle of complementarity regulates the relationship between the ICC and 
national jurisdictions. This fundamental principle was critical to gaining support for 
the permanent court during the Rome Conference, which one commentator has 
called “the most complex multilateral negotiation ever undertaken.”24 Article 17 was 
                                                
 
20 Id. ¶ 46. 
21 It is interesting to take note of the composition of the judges. Two African judges were in 
the majority, including Judge Daniel David Ntanda Nsereko from Kenya’s neighboring state, 
Uganda, who presided over the matter, and Judge Akua Kuenyehia, from Ghana in West 
Africa. The others in the majority were Judge Sang-Hyun Song (Republic of Korea) and Judge 
Erkki Kourula (Finland). The lone dissenter, Judge Anita Ušacka, is from Latvia. 
22 See Dissenting Opinion, supra note 2, ¶ 15. 
23 Id. ¶¶ 24–30. 
24 Sharon A. Williams & William A. Schabas, Article 17: Issues of Admissibility, in 
COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 605, 613 (Otto Triffterer ed., 2008); see also John T. 
Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE 
MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE: ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999); 
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incorporated into the Rome Statute to explicitly provide a substantive rule by which 
to enforce complementarity ideals.25 Complementarity, therefore, lies at the heart of 
both Article 17 and the Court’s rejection of Kenya’s admissibility challenge. By 
examining the broader purpose of complementarity in this comment, it will hopefully 
be possible to re-evaluate the Appeals and Pre-Trial Chamber’s decision and to better 
consider the relatively unrefuted but important arguments that Kenya raised in its 
application.26  
In choosing complementarity as the preferred method of regulating the relationship 
between the Court and national jurisdictions, the creators of the ICC had three main 
experiences with international penal jurisdictions from which to draw;27 the 
International Military Tribunals at Nuremberg/Tokyo, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY), and the International Criminal Tribunal 
for Rwanda (ICTR) also had to determine the relationship of those institutions to 
national courts with competing jurisdictional claims.28  
The U.N. Security Council, in setting up the ad hoc tribunals pursuant to its mandate 
to ensure the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of 
the U.N. Charter, adopted the primacy principle. Under that principle, the 
international tribunal can displace the jurisdiction of the national courts without 
needing to demonstrate a failure or inadequacy of the domestic system.29 However, 
the ICTY and ICTR were situation-specific responses with a jurisdictional reach 
limited by, among other factors, the three substantive crimes (genocide, crimes against 
humanity, and war crimes) that they were mandated to prosecute and, more 
                                                                                                                       
 
John T. Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE OF 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 
2002). 
25 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY ON 
THE ROME STATUTE 335–52 (2010). 
26 Kenya has appealed the decision with respect to all six suspects. Its filings are the same in 
both cases. See Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey & Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Appeal of the 
Government of Kenya Against the “Decision on the Application by the Government of 
Kenya Challenging the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute” 
(June 6, 2011), www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1084702.pdf; Prosecutor v. Ruto, Kosgey & 
Sang, Case No. ICC-01/09-01/11, Document in Support of the “Appeal of the Government 
of Kenya Against the Decision on the Application by the Government of Kenya Challenging 
the Admissibility of the Case Pursuant to Article 19(2)(b) of the Statute” (June 20, 2011), 
www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1094690.pdf. 
27 JANN K. KLEFFNER, COMPLEMENTARITY IN THE ROME STATUTE AND NATIONAL 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTIONS 60 (2008). 
28 Kevin Jon Heller, A Sentence-Based Theory of Complementarity, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 201 
(2012).  
29 KLEFFNER, supra note 27, at 61–70. 
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importantly, the geographic and temporal scope over particular historical incidents.30 
It may therefore not be surprising that when deciding how to structure a treaty-based 
permanent international penal tribunal court with a global jurisdiction, states shied 
away from primacy in favor of the more deferential and more pragmatic principle of 
complementarity, which envisages national authorities as the first bulwark in the fight 
against impunity.31 This despite that some countries and human rights advocates 
preferred to have a powerful court with primacy as its core jurisdictional principle.  
Beginning with the International Law Commission’s 1994 Draft Statute, through the 
various ad hoc committee meetings in 1996 all the way to the Rome Conference in 
1998, complementarity was contentiously debated.32 Some thought its inclusion in 
both the Preamble and Article 1 of the ICC Statute was sufficient to establish 
complementarity as the guiding principle for interpretation of the rest of the statute, 
but it was ultimately encapsulated in Article 17 as well.33 While discussions of the 
complementarity principle divided delegates, the main impetus and implication for its 
inclusion was clear and predicated on pragmatism: it would protect national 
sovereignty and increase the willingness of states to accept the Court’s jurisdiction.  
The shift from primacy to complementarity, and the pulling back of the comparatively 
more sweeping authority given to the ICTY and ICTR vis-à-vis national courts is 
therefore both a function of the differing contexts within which each international 
jurisdiction was created and the desire to have an effective permanent and global 
institution that will supplement, instead of supplant, the work of national criminal 
jurisdictions. Whereas under Articles 9(2) and 8(2) of the ICTY and ICTR Statutes,34 
respectively, the international tribunals may, at any stage of the process, formally 
request national courts to defer to their competence in particular cases. Article 17 of 
the Rome Statute essentially reverses this situation. It instead directs the ICC to defer 
to the national jurisdictions that are genuinely willing and able to investigate and 
prosecute.  
Although it appears that with this strict interpretation of complementarity the Appeals 
Chamber has effectively turned complementarity into primacy, contrasting these two 
different organizing principles should provide a helpful context within which to 
                                                
 
30 Id. 
31 For a useful discussion of the two models, see Bartram S. Brown, Primacy or 
Complementarity: Reconciling the Jurisdiction of National Courts and International Criminal Tribunals, 23 
YALE J. INT’L L. 383 (1998); Adolphus G. Karibi-Whyte, The Twin Ad Hoc Tribunals and Primacy 
Over National Courts, 9 CRIM. L.F. 55 (1998). 
32 Williams & Schabas, supra note 24, at 607–13. 
33 Id. at 612–13. 
34 The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 9(2), 
May 25, 1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993); The Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for 
Rwanda art. 8(2), Nov. 8, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994). 
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evaluate the Kenya inadmissibility decision. In this regard, in this comment, I consider 
two important questions. First, does the Appeals Chamber decision remain true to the 
underlying precepts of complementarity? And second, is there an alternative way in 
which Kenya’s admissibility challenge could have been addressed that would better 
reflect not only the letter but also the spirit of complementarity? 
At the outset, it is evident that there are at least two differing interpretations of 
complementarity competing within the Appeals Chamber admissibility ruling. The 
first is Kenya’s and the dissent’s view of complementarity, which is that national 
jurisdictions should win almost by default except where there is strong or even 
overwhelming evidence rebutting the presumption in favor of their first right to 
prosecute.35 As part of this, the government and Judge Ušacka emphasized that the 
ICC was intended to complement the work of national jurisdictions when they 
exercise their primary duty to investigate and prosecute international crimes; a matter 
that, not coincidentally, also goes to the heart of state sovereignty. The second is the 
Court’s application of complementarity, which is that the primary goal of the Rome 
Statute is to help put an end to impunity, and whatever division of labor accomplishes 
that end will, or rather should, win out.36  
Both of these formulations have some historical grounding. The Kenya conception 
finds support in the Rome Statute and in the drafting history of the complementarity 
provision during the Rome Conference as well as the preparatory committees, where 
the preservation of national sovereignty was a primary goal. The Court’s conception 
appears to rest primarily on a broader, more interventionist and perhaps unrealistic 
vision of the ICC. On this view, the crimes over which the permanent tribunal has 
jurisdiction are international in nature. Since the ICC was created in order to end 
impunity in relation to them, the application of the complementarity clause should be 
read flexibly and not be construed too restrictively. Otherwise, the international penal 
court will lose its leverage over national jurisdictions and become unable to fulfill the 
broader noble mission of ensuring criminal prosecutions of those most responsible 
for international crimes.37 Both these interpretations are reflected in the preamble to 
the Rome Statute, granting some textual grounding to each interpretation.38  
While it seems apparent that both positions generally fall within the boundaries of 
complementarity, meaning that each interpretation could be seen as valid, it seems 
arguable that neither position remains entirely consistent with other core substantive 
principles. Kenya’s understanding of admissibility clearly expands the complementary 
                                                
 
35 Dissenting Opinion, supra note 2, at ¶¶ 23–28. 
36 Appeals Chamber Judgment, supra note 2, ¶ 40.  
37 For an excellent article on the manner in which complementarity has been misconstrued 
in the literature, see Darryl Robinson, The Mysterious Mysteriousness of Complementarity, 21 CRIM. 
L.F. 67 (2010). 
38 Rome Statute, supra note 1, preamble. 
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test too far to give the appearance that the six cases at issue obviously fall within the 
realm of the inadmissible. In doing so, however, it seemed to oversimplify the issue 
and boiled the entire inquiry down to whether or not the national jurisdiction is 
willing to assert a claim over the case and gives a promise to proceed with some 
investigations or prosecutions. While the idea that an ICC State Party has the first 
right to prosecute is on solid ground, as even a cursory look at the Rome Statute will 
confirm, the suggestion that mere expression of an intent to proceed against an 
amorphous group of unidentified suspects that may or may not include the suspects 
presently before the Court swings the pendulum too far in the opposite direction.  
On the other hand, although the Court’s way of interpreting admissibility should 
depend on the facts of each case, its approach arguably endorses an unnecessarily 
straight-jacketed reading of Article 17. By rejecting all of Kenya’s stated objectives to 
make wide ranging legal reforms to its justice system in the hope that it will retain the 
cases involving its nationals, including adhering to a self-imposed strict timetable for 
its planned reforms, the Court lost an opportunity to breathe life into the oft 
discussed idea of positive complementarity which in practice will require a generous 
view of the ambit of the provision in an effort to encourage or promote national 
attempts to prosecute. In its interpretative stance, the Appeals Chamber gave itself 
wide latitude that could be invoked to engage in outright judicial rejections of any 
legitimate national attempts to prosecute crimes that occur within a state thereby 
effectively turning complementarity into primacy.  
By refining but essentially retaining the strict “same person/same conduct” test, 
which gave limited wiggle room for states to make different investigating or charging 
decisions vis-à-vis the ICC Prosecutor, the Appeals Chamber has placed extremely 
high and perhaps even unrealistic demands on States Parties seeking to assert 
jurisdiction over the international crimes that occur within their territory. This high 
threshold, which if taken to its logical conclusion might undermine or dampen 
national efforts to prosecute, works against the pragmatic burden-sharing goals of 
complementarity in at least two ways.  
First, although the majority tweaked the complementarity test from the initial “same 
person-same conduct” to “same person substantially same conduct” formulation, this 
does not appear to radically impact the admissibility test. On their face, both the 
earlier and latest tests would require that the national authorities be investigating the 
same person at the time of the inadmissibility challenge. This makes sense for many 
reasons, including the fact that it prevents states from manipulating the ICC to shield 
favored suspects from international prosecutions. I therefore do not see serious 
difficulty with the first part of the test. But the revised test also requires national 
prosecutors to focus on “substantially the same conduct” of the same individuals. The 
ordinary dictionary meaning of “substantially,” the adverb form of “substantial,” 
clarifies that it means, “to a great or significant extent,” and “for the most part; 
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essentially.”39 The term is a qualifier of the second element of the test, which insists 
on targeting of the “same conduct” of the alleged perpetrator.  
It follows from the above that so long as the national authority is essentially pursuing 
the same individual for essentially the same conduct, then it may succeed in clawing 
back a case that otherwise would remain within the ICC prosecutor’s jurisdiction. If 
the government is not investigating the person, as Kenya was found not to be, then it 
would not be entitled to take back the case as long as the case is in the hands of the 
ICC. If it investigates the same person, but focuses on aspects of his conduct that is 
not substantially the same because, for example, it wants to minimize the suspect’s 
role by taking up the lesser of the incidents under investigation, it equally cannot claw 
back the case. This reasoning appears correct because it makes it difficult for states 
parties to the ICC to play games with the Court and shield powerful friends by (1) 
focusing on different suspects for crimes arising out of the same incidents or (2) 
undermining the cause of justice by deliberately choosing to charge the suspect with 
crimes reflecting the less serious conduct.   
The problem is that, under both these tests, there seems to be limited discretion for a 
national prosecutor to choose to charge the same person for a lesser offence or to 
charge someone else deemed more culpable, for instance, for conduct constituting 
murder as an ordinary offense under domestic law instead of murder as a crime 
against humanity. Both the mens rea (guilty mind) and actus reus (act) elements of those 
two offenses would be the same, although all things being equal, it would be harder to 
prove murder as a crime against humanity because the offense will additionally require 
proof of the so-called contextual elements that transform the ordinary offense into an 
international one.40 So, besides the requirement that the perpetrator must have 
intentionally caused the death of another human being, which would be the test for 
ordinary murder, there would have to be evidence that the killing took place (1) as 
part of a widespread or systematic attack direct against any civilian population and 
that the suspect (2) knew of or intended his actions to further those broader attacks 
for it to be transformed into a crime against humanity.41  
A key question then arises: if the goal of the ICC is to ensure that states dispense 
justice for heinous crimes committed in a given situation, why would the Court care 
which crime the person will be charged with at the national level if the national 
authorities are investigating or prosecuting him for the problematic conduct? In other 
words, as Professor William Schabas has argued, it seems unnecessary to reduce 
admissibility challenges to “a mechanistic comparison of charges in the national and 
the international jurisdictions, in order to see whether a crime contemplated by the 
                                                
 
39 CONCISE OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 1438 (11th ed. 2008). 
40 For a discussion of this requirement, see Jalloh, supra note 3, at 544–45. 
41 See Rome Statute, supra note 1, art. 7.  
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Rome Statute is being prosecuted directly or even indirectly.”42 He rightly suggested 
that the better approach would be to make “an assessment of the relative gravity of 
the offen[s]es tried by the national jurisdiction put alongside those of the international 
jurisdiction.”43  
Similarly, Kevin Jon Heller’s recent article suggests that complementarity should be 
interpreted in a way that encourages, not discourages, states from prosecuting 
international crimes as ordinary crimes.44 He argues that squeezing complementarity 
into the same conduct analysis should be abandoned and be replaced by a new 
sentence-based theory under which any national prosecution of an ordinary crime 
satisfies the complementarity requirement if it results in a sentence that is equal to, or 
greater than, the sentence the perpetrator would receive from the ICC.45 This could 
be one way to solve the problem, although it may not necessarily be ideal. Ultimately, 
though this is not to condone Kenya’s problematic failure to initially prosecute the 
crimes through its national courts or before a specially constituted tribunal before the 
Court got involved, it should be sufficient if the offender is being held accountable 
for serious crimes, especially if the end result is the same or similar.46 By taking 
jurisdiction under the current framework, the appeals court seems to continue the 
logic of accountability in a purposive way which is laudable, although some might see 
this as taking it beyond what states would have initially anticipated as the proper role 
of the ICC during the Rome Conference.   
One fairly straightforward objection to giving national prosecutors a free hand to 
choose what crime to charge the suspect would be that indicting someone for 
committing murder as an ordinary offense carries less moral opprobrium than saying 
that he perpetrated crimes against humanity, even if the underlying act is the same. 
Yet, it is possible to imagine some instances where national prosecutors could 
legitimately choose to focus on different suspects than those of interest to the ICC 
prosecutor. What will happen, for example, if the national investigation revealed that 
someone who was not yet a suspect before the Court was the most culpable for the 
crimes? We might respond: that person too would deserve to be prosecuted, in 
addition to the person whose case is the subject of the admissibility challenge before 
the international court. In such a situation, in fact, it may be that no problem or 
conflict of jurisdictions arises that would require the Court to relinquish a case to the 
State Party challenging admissibility. In fact, keeping in mind the purpose of the 
                                                
 
42 WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
182 (2007). 
43 Id. 
44 See generally Heller, supra note 28. 
45 Id.  
46 See Charles C. Jalloh, Kenya’s Dangerous Dance with Impunity, JURIST (Aug. 18, 2009), 
http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/forumy/2009/08/kenyas-dangerous-dance-with-impunity.php 
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Rome Statute, one could say that this is exactly the type of role that the ICC should 
play—to catalyze national action to prosecute heinous crimes and in that way reduce 
the accountability gap. This effect should thus be welcomed because it forces the 
State Party and the ICC to prosecute even more people for the crimes committed in a 
given context than might otherwise be the case without the Court’s involvement.  
On the other hand, what if the national jurisdiction can only prosecute a handful of 
people due to limited resources? This scenario is not so implausible given the conflict-
post-conflict context of most of the situations that so far and will seemingly continue 
to come before the Court. Further, what if the State Party decides to appease the 
victims’ demand for justice by choosing to focus not on the distant leader who 
orchestrated the crimes and is appropriately of investigative interest to the ICC, but 
on the enthusiastic killer who directly perpetrated the atrocities? Imagine further that, 
for these reasons, the national prosecutor, in contrast to the ICC prosecutor, selects 
the suspect whose conduct was so egregious given the gravity, brutality, and scale of 
his crimes that they prefer to have him removed from the community.47 In that 
situation, it would seem hard to justify prosecuting the less directly culpable person, 
instead of the more directly culpable one, only to satisfy the high standard that the 
ICC’s admissibility test sets in order for the government to pre-empt its prosecution 
of crimes arising out of the same incidents. Of course, under the Rome Statute, the 
ICC is barred, because of the double jeopardy rule, from seeking to prosecute the 
same person who has already been prosecuted before the national courts—as 
Professor Linda Carter cogently explained in an in depth article on the issue.48 
An alternative judicial approach in the Kenya admissibility decision could have 
attempted to find a middle ground between the extreme interpretations given by the 
majority, on the one hand, and the dissenting judge on the other, preserving both the 
primacy of national jurisdiction as well as the Court’s ability to evaluate and shape 
domestic criminal proceedings. Indeed, there are ample provisions in the Rome 
Statute directed at encouraging national proceedings through bilateral discussions with 
the prosecution before an ICC investigation escalates to the point where a formal 
admissibility challenge is required.49 The overall thrust of the scheme is international 
deference to genuine national processes.  
In this context, keeping in mind the catch that in the admissibility challenge in this 
case the issue was how actually how “genuine” the government was in its purported 
                                                
 
47 For the victims, convicting someone for murder as an ordinary crime instead of murder as 
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desire to prosecute the post-election violence through its national courts, one solution 
could have been to suspend or defer the ICC prosecutor’s investigation in Kenya to 
give the State an opportunity to conduct its own investigation and prosecution of the 
suspects while also closely monitoring the ongoing proceedings to ensure that they 
remained genuinely directed at the same “case.” Article 18(2) appears to provide the 
framework for such a deferral, even if the “within one month” time limitation makes 
the provision not entirely applicable to the Kenya case. Still, under that provision, the 
ICC Prosecutor is required to step aside when a State informs the Court that it is 
investigating or has investigated persons within its jurisdiction for criminal acts that 
constitute offenses under the Rome Statute.50 In fact, upon receipt of that notice, she 
can only proceed with an investigation if the Pre-Trial Chamber decides to authorize 
him to so do. In the Kenya situation, the government actually requested the assistance 
of the Court.51 And while perhaps it would have slowed down how quickly justice can 
be rendered, such a halfway solution would have numerous advantages over the 
Court’s outright dismissal of the admissibility application.  
First, such a solution would continue to foster the development of national solutions 
to combat international crimes, which is the stated purpose of the ICC.52  
 
Second, much like the manner in which the ICTY and ICTR now transfer and 
monitor cases of high value suspects to national jurisdictions under tribunal authority 
with the option to claw them back, it would maintain ICC leverage over the national 
criminal proceedings and eliminate the possibility of shielding by Kenya. Indeed, 
besides the extensive mechanisms providing for cooperation between the Court and 
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51 Situation in the Republic of Kenya, No. ICC-01/09-63, Decision on the Request for 
Assistance Submitted on Behalf of the Government of the Republic of Kenya Pursuant to 
Article 93(10) of the Statute and Rule 194 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, ¶¶ 33–34 
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52 Rome Statute, supra note 1, preamble 
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national jurisdictions, thinking outside of the Rome Statute box would potentially 
have also been helpful to the Court.  
For one thing, the Court could have referred to the extensive body of jurisprudence 
that has emerged from the Rule 11 bis transfers process under which those U.N. 
tribunals send cases to willing national jurisdictions for prosecutions under certain 
conditions, if a fair trial is deemed possible, and the death penalty would not be 
applied.53 The effect that such transfers of cases have had, especially on improving the 
fairness of the Rwandese justice system, appears to be nothing short of remarkable. In 
any event, the ICC approach seems to go not only against the explicit requirements of 
its statute but also against the current trajectory of international criminal justice—even 
ad hoc courts said to have primacy over national courts, have come to recognize that 
it is only pragmatic that national courts first attempt to prosecute the international 
crimes that occurred on their territories. That approach also recognizes that an 
international jurisdiction, no matter how well endowed, can at best prosecute a small 
fraction of the cases that can be properly pursued within willing and capable national 
jurisdictions and courts.  
Third, it would uphold the broader purpose of the ICC to help challenge impunity 
and ensure the prosecution of international crimes without overreaching and thereby 
placing the Court on a collision course with states whose cooperation will ultimately 
be crucial for its success in holding trials of suspects if indeed their charges are later 
confirmed.  
Fourth, it would not commit the ICC to any specific interpretation of Article 17 that 
could negatively impact the way it handles future admissibility dilemmas.  
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Finally, it would more adequately address Kenya’s “let us take a big picture” approach 
to complementarity argument the merits of which the pre-trial and majority of the 
appeal judges basically failed, or rather, refused to engage. Again, a perusal of the 
drafting history or the Rome Statute shows that the ICC system was always 
conceptualized as a secondary, back-up mechanism to that of States Parties. 54 This is 
not to say that one does not have sympathy for the difficulties that the Court faced in 
this context where the Kenyan public apparently prefers The Hague option be 
exercised while governmental authorities were pushing the Nairobi option largely 
because what will happen to the cases is more apparently within their control.  
The approach of enabling national prosecutions is just one possible solution that 
could have been utilized by the Appeals Chamber instead of summarily dismissing 
Kenya’s ambitious plans. It is not necessarily the best solution that could have been 
found, but its core advantage is rooted in the raison d’etre of complementarity and in 
the long-term thinking that extends beyond the details of the particular cases before 
the Court and its role in a broader system of international criminal justice. The 
analysis shows that, at a minimum, the judges’ strict application of the same 
“person/same conduct” test arguably does not respect and nurture the growth of 
complementarity and the anti-impunity work of national jurisdictions upon which the 
Rome Statute was predicated. The proposed alternative solution of suspensions or a 
deferral, perhaps on condition that the ICC Prosecutor monitors the trials and report 
back to the Pre-Trial Chamber every six months, would respect those goals while 
simultaneously maintaining safeguards against the risk of allowing impunity to prevail 
for the heinous crimes against humanity committed in Kenya.  
VII. CONCLUSION 
By way of conclusion, since Kenya’s appeal has been lost before the ICC Appeals 
Chamber and the Court’s situations docket continues to grow, it is clear that the 
appeals judges will, over the next few years, have other opportunities to define the 
parameters of complementarity following a challenge to admissibility by a State Party. 
The judges should keep in mind how their interpretation in future Article 19 
admissibility challenges will shape the actions of national jurisdictions. This includes 
not just the jurisdiction in question, but all 122 current ICC States Parties with which 
the Court will potentially work in the future. All of them will be watching to see 
whether it will respect the bargain in Article 17 and the rest of the Rome Statute: that 
the tribunal will defer to their competence to investigate or prosecute genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes in their national courts wherever they are 
willing and able to do so. More fundamentally, at least for the African cases, even if 
they do not necessarily initially have the capacity to investigate and prosecute, they 
could rely to a certain measure on the Court’s flexibility to help the undertake the 
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requisite legal and judicial sector reforms to enable them to discharge their obligations 
under the Rome Statute.   
As the Court now works with its Kenya cases, it is also creating de facto guidelines for 
operation that will be noted by all other national jurisdictions within and outside the 
Rome system of justice.55 The relationship between the ICC and national jurisdictions 
in this way reflect many similarities to that of the federal and state courts in the 
American judicial system.56 By deferring jurisdiction, the Court gains the invaluable 
opportunity to direct national proceedings thereby giving effect to the much discussed 
but seemingly not yet applied ideal of positive complementarity. By giving a less 
stringent and more generous interpretation to admissibility, it will permit non-
Western states an opportunity to conduct criminal proceedings through trial and error 
with the ICC, while the rest of the world watches and brings itself into compliance 
with the international obligations to prosecute crimes against humanity. It is in this 
way, rather than a one size fits all approach to complementarity that takes as sole 
referent the standard of justice in developed Western states, that the ICC will help 
contribute to the grand goal of eradicating the culture of impunity that has far too 
long made national prosecutions of international crimes the exception rather than the 
rule.  
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